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This article examines conflicts over the rights of prisoners and 
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procreate, and Oakley v. Wisconsin, which addresses whether men 
convicted of failing to pay child support lose their right to procreate.  
I argue that regardless of whether courts uphold or restrict men’s 
rights in these cases, the way courts frame their decisions has negative 
implications for women.  By addressing cases concerning both men 
and women from 1967-2002, this article contributes to a more 
thorough understanding of reproductive control in the criminal 
justice system, its significance for gender equality, and the right of all 
people, regardless of wealth, to have families. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the winter of 2000, Judge Dorothy McCarter of Helena, Montana 
ordered Dawn Sprinkle, who had been convicted of using drugs 
during pregnancy and who later violated her probation, not to get 
pregnant for ten years.1  Specifically, Judge McCarter sentenced her 
to ten years in prison (suspending five), and ordered Sprinkle to take 
birth control pills and report for regular pregnancy tests at the local 
jail.2  Should Sprinkle become pregnant after serving her time, Judge 
McCarter would jail her again or place her under some other form of 
intensive supervision.3  As a twenty-nine-year-old woman, Sprinkle 
thus faced a decade of intrusive regulation into her intimate life and 
health care decisions, as well as the chance that this sentence would 
foreclose the possibility of her ever again having a child.4 
A spokeswoman for the National Organization for Women told a 
reporter, “I have never heard of a judge curtailing a man’s 
reproductive life because of drug use; this is exclusively focused on 
women.”5  This spokeswoman echoes a common refrain, and with 
respect to drug use, it may be true, but to the small extent that 
appellate courts have been willing to uphold sex or fertility-related 
conditions of probation, they have done so with respect to men.6  
                                                          
 1. See State v. Sprinkle, No. 99-55 (D. Mont. Feb. 23, 2000).  See generally Lynn 
M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 
ALB. L. REV. 999 (1999) (noting that outside of South Carolina, appellate courts have 
rejected criminal convictions for child endangerment on the basis of a positive drug 
test at birth). 
 2. See Brief for Respondent at 2, State v. Sprinkle (D. Mont. Feb. 23, 2000) (No. 
00-309). 
 3. See Lawrence Hall, Editorial, A Miscarriage of Justice in the Case of a 
Montana Mom, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 23, 2000, at 11 (quoting the judge as saying that 
she “doesn’t want another damaged baby born because we didn’t do enough to 
supervise that woman”); see also Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Sprinkle (No. 00-309). 
 4. See Brief for Respondent at 3-6, Sprinkle (No. 00-309). 
 5. Hall, supra note 3, at 11. 
 6. See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (upholding the 
defendant’s condition of probation, which prohibited him from having any more 
2
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Does this mean that the criminal sentencing arena is one where 
women enjoy greater reproductive freedom than men?  Such a 
conclusion may be premature.  The public record suggests that courts 
are more likely to impose reproductive restrictions on women in the 
first place.  And as my reading of the decisions shows, court orders 
restricting men’s fertility can only be carried out on the backs of 
women.7  Moreover, corrections officials and courts invoke the 
principles of gender equality and fairness to women in order to justify 
limiting men’s reproductive options.  In doing so, they manage both 
to hold women responsible for men’s grievances and to compromise 
women’s claims to constitutional equality. 
While cases like Sprinkle’s have periodically made the news for 
more than a decade, two higher court decisions have recently raised 
the stakes.  One decision, out of the “liberal” Ninth Circuit, upheld 
men’s rights, but justified the holding in part by a retrograde 
Supreme Court decision undermining women’s rights to equal 
protection.8  The other case concerns what constitutes legitimate 
punishment for a “deadbeat dad.”  That decision divided the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court along gender lines, with the four male 
justices upholding the punishment and the three women, though in 
the gender group more likely to suffer from delinquent support, all 
dissenting.9  Both cases help establish a precedent that has negative 
implications for women, regardless of whether these decisions and 
subseqent holdings uphold or restrict men’s rights. 
These decisions inspire a number of questions: What kind of 
gender politics do we find in these cases?  Given that women and men 
of color are much more likely to be criminal defendants, how does 
race infuse those politics?  What do the cases mean for women and 
men in the criminal justice system and beyond? 
Part I of this article briefly outlines the standards that courts use to 
evaluate whether and to what extent a person retains rights during 
prison and probation.  Part II examines how men have fared in 
asserting their right to procreate from within the confines of prison.10  
                                                          
children until he could show his ability to support his existing children). 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 273 
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff’d, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the 
lower court’s decision that “the right to procreate does not survive incarceration”).  
This decision relies in part on a Supreme Court case which upheld a gender-based 
immigration policy on the basis of stereotypes derived from the biological differences 
between men and women in procreation.  See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001). 
 9. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (listing the judges on the court). 
 10. On female prisoners’ assertions of reproductive rights, see generally Ellen 
Barry, Women Prisoners and Health Care: Locked Up and Locked Out, in MAN-MADE 
3
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Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately retreated on male prisoners’ 
rights, the original panel decision is important because its reasoning 
provides the only model for other courts.  Parts III-V then examine 
the nature and status of reproductive penalties imposed on men and 
women sentenced to probation, beginning with the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s “deadbeat dad” case and identifying distinctive 
gendered patterns emerging out of a quarter century of such cases.11  
I conclude with some observations about the significance of these 
cases, which are too easily dismissed as inconsequential or the work of 
a maverick judge, instead of as a serious threat to women’s rights, 
prisoners’ rights, and reproductive rights. 
I. RIGHTS RETAINED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
People on probation and parole, in jail and in prison, have engaged 
in considerable litigation over the question of what fundamental 
rights they retain while under state supervision or behind bars.12  
These questions have never been more important than they are today.  
More than six million people are under some form of criminal justice 
supervision, more than two million of them behind bars, making the 
United States the world leader in incarceration.13  A majority of these 
prisoners are African American, Latino/a, and Native American men 
and women.14  Mandatory sentencing and “three strikes” policies are 
of special concern to prisoners and their life partners who may want 
children because such policies ensure that prisoners will be 
                                                          
MEDICINE: WOMEN’S HEALTH, PUBLIC POLICY, AND REFORM (Kary Moss ed., 1996) 
(describing litigation by women in prison to improve pregnancy care, general 
gynecological care, and access to abortion, but not to assert the right to become 
pregnant).  See also Rachel Roth, Do Prisoners Have Abortion Rights?, 30 FEMINIST 
STUDIES 353 (2004). 
 11. Given the vagaries of media interest as well as the vagaries of electronic 
databases and their search engines, it is likely impossible to identify all instances 
where judges have imposed reproductive penalties. This article is based on those cases 
that I learned about in court opinions and scholarly sources, as well as additional 
cases identified by searching news and legal databases. 
 12. See, e.g., Lisa Davie Levinson, Prisoners’ Rights, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1055, 
1055-56 (1998) (providing a brief history of the court opinions shaping which 
fundamental rights prisoners retain).  See generally JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY (2000) (discussing 
the development of constitutional law relating to prisoners’ rights). 
 13. See Lauren E. Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2002, 2003 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
ppus02.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2004); see also Editorial, Unfree in America, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2003, at D10. 
 14. See Paige M. Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2003, 2004 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 8 (reporting incarceration rates by 
race), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim03.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2004).  More than ninety percent of prisoners are men.  Id. at 5. 
4
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss3/1
  
2004]    NO NEW BABIES?  GENDER INEQUALITY IN PRISON SYSTEMS 395 
incarcerated for long periods of time.15 
Probation is the most common criminal sanction.16  When 
someone is sentenced to probation, she is spared the total physical 
restraint of incarceration, but is nonetheless under the dominion of 
the state and lives with a diminished expectation of privacy and 
freedom.  According to the California court of appeals, the purpose of 
probation is: “to foster rehabilitation and to protect the public to the 
end that justice may be done.”17  Sentencing judges typically have 
broad discretion to implement this policy goal.  In Wisconsin, for 
instance, the statute on probation states that, “the court may impose 
any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate.”18  A 
judge might order someone into drug treatment, for example, to 
abstain from alcohol and stay out of bars, to work, go to school, or not 
to see certain people.19  Judges have been praised and rebuked for 
imposing “shame” penalties, such as wearing a T-shirt that proclaims 
“I am a thief.”20 
Although the state wields great power through the probation 
system, that power is not exempt from all constitutional scrutiny.  In 
general, conditions should be narrowly tailored when they impinge 
on constitutional rights.21  The United States Supreme Court 
recognized in 1973 that the revocation of probation, while “not a 
stage of a criminal prosecution,” does “result in a loss of liberty,”22 
thus implicating due process concerns that cannot be written off on 
the theory that probation is “an act of grace.”23 
Where prisoners are concerned, the United States Supreme Court 
has upheld as a general principle that prisoners “retain those 
                                                          
 15. See generally Angela Y. Davis & Cassandra Shaylor, Race, Gender, and the 
Prison Industrial Complex: California and Beyond, 2 MERIDIANS 1 (2001) (describing 
the relationship between sentencing policies and prison expansion). 
 16. See Glaze, supra note 13, at 1; see also LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF 
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: IN A NUTSHELL 70 (5th ed. 1998) 
(“[P]robation is the most frequently imposed criminal sanction.”). 
 17. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 18. WIS. STAT. § 973.09 (1998) (amended 2004) (emphasis added). 
 19. See BRANHAM, supra note 16, at 70-74; see also id. at 71 (“Sentencing courts 
have traditionally been accorded broad discretion when defining the conditions of a 
probation sentence.”). 
 20. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police: Following the Law Because You’d Be 
Embarrassed Not To, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20-27, 1997, at 170 (noting the use of such 
punishments for “low level crimes”). 
 21. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
 22. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
 23. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 n.2 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.4) 
(illustrating that the “grace” theory nonetheless remains alive and well in some 
courts, including Wisconsin’s highest court). 
5
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constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with [their] status as 
prisoners.”24  In the 1987 case Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court 
clarified its approach to prisoners’ rights claims.25  The Court rejected 
a strict scrutiny approach, even for alleged infringements of 
fundamental rights, and instead concluded that “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation 
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”26 
security being the dominant interest.27 
The Court then articulated a four-part test of reasonableness:28 
1.  A rational relationship between the regulation and the 
legitimate and neutral governmental interest that is put forward to 
justify the regulation;29 
2.  The existence of alternative means to exercise the asserted 
right;30 
3.  The impact on prison staff, other prisoners, and prison 
resources of accommodating the asserted right;31 and 
4.  The existence of “ready alternatives” to accommodate the 
asserted right at “de minimis” cost to valid penological interests.32 
Under this framework, the Court upheld a Missouri regulation 
restricting prisoners’ rights to correspond with prisoners at other 
institutions, citing concerns with security and burdens on the staff to 
screen mail.33  In contrast, the Court struck down a regulation 
restricting prisoners’ right to marry without the superintendent’s 
permission and absent such “compelling” situations as pregnancy or 
                                                          
 24. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817, 822 (1974)). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 89. 
 27. See id. (claiming that a strict scrutiny analysis would restrict prison personnel 
from dealing effectively with security concerns). 
 28. See id. at 89-91. 
 29. See id. at 89 (holding that infringements on prisoners’ constitutional rights 
are subjected to low-level scrutiny, also known as the rational basis test). 
 30. See id. at 90 (concluding that the courts should defer to prison officials’ 
judgment when prisoners will retain the ability to exercise their constitutional right 
despite the regulation). 
 31. See id. (reasoning that prisons are best able to predict the effect of imposing a 
regulation).  Therefore, courts should give great deference to prison officials under 
this prong.  Id. 
 32. See id. at 90-91 (explaining that while officials should not restrict the 
constitutional rights of prisoners when there is a “ready alternative” to doing so, the 
Court is not requiring a “least restrictive alternative test”). 
 33. See id. at 93 (declaring that forcing officials to read prisoners’ mail would be 
ineffective in detecting dangerous correspondence because of the “jargon” and 
“codes” used). 
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the birth of an illegitimate child.34 
Turner is thus important for two reasons: the case establishes a 
standard of review,35 and it upholds the right to marry.36  The Court 
reasoned that while incarceration necessarily imposes substantial 
restrictions on marriage, many important attributes of marriage 
remain: 
First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional 
support and public commitment. . . . In addition, many religions 
recognize marriages as having spiritual significance . . . .  Third, 
most inmates will eventually be released by parole or commutation, 
and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation 
that they ultimately will be fully consummated.  Finally, marital 
status is often a pre-condition to the receipt of government 
benefits . . . property rights . . . and other, less tangible benefits. . . . 
These incidents of marriage . . . are unaffected by the fact of 
confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.37 
As the phrase “expectation of ultimate consummation” suggests, the 
courts have not held that prisoners have a constitutional right to 
conjugal visits.38  In the few states where such visits are permitted, they 
are typically established by state statute or regulation and are at the 
discretion of prison administrators.39 
II. GENDER EQUALITY AND THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE FROM PRISON 
Few courts have addressed whether and to what extent the right to 
procreate survives incarceration, even though the fundamental nature 
of the right to procreate is well established.  Only three men have 
brought claims to court seeking to exercise a right to procreate 
                                                          
 34. See id. at 97 (holding that the restriction on marriage was not rationally 
related to a legitimate and neutral goal; it did not pass low level constitutional 
scrutiny analysis). The Court found that the superintendent “routinely” approved 
men’s marriages, but did not make clear whether he did so for reasons other than the 
“compelling” ones.  Id.  The superintendent expressed concern that female prisoners 
had been abused by men or overly dependent on men and this abuse or dependence 
had contributed to their criminal activity; hence, he wanted them to focus on 
developing their independence instead of getting married.  Id. 
 35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (identifying the low level rational 
basis analysis). 
 36. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-95 (stating that restrictions on marriage violated 
the rational basis test). 
 37. Id. at 95-96. 
 38. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994) 
(interpreting Turner as including only marriage, not sex, as a right maintained by 
prisoners). 
 39. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 (holding that while California may permit 
conjugal visits, there is no constitutional right to such visits). 
7
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during their prison terms.40  Any decision in this area will have a 
disproportionate impact on the reproductive possibilities of African 
American and Latino men, who are over-represented in the nation’s 
prisons, but the cases themselves do not appear to be overtly 
racialized.  The public record contains no information about the 
individual plaintiffs’ racial identities, and the language of the 
decisions is not explicitly racially coded.  One of the judges involved 
wrote that “the court hastens to speculate as to the institutional and 
societal chaos which would result” if prisoners were granted the right 
to procreate, but his fear was not clearly directed at any particular 
group, except perhaps women.41  All three men who have sought to 
exercise their procreative liberties are married, leaving no 
opportunity to expound about “illegitimate” children, a theme 
evident in cases restricting people on probation from having 
children.42 
In September 2001, a court vindicated one of these claims for the 
first time, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld two-to-one 
the procreative rights of a married man serving a life sentence.43  
Because he is a “lifer,” William Gerber is not eligible for conjugal 
visits, as are other married prisoners in California.44  In order to have 
a baby with his wife, Gerber requested permission to send his wife 
semen so that she might become pregnant through alternative 
insemination.  Specifically, Gerber sought to provide semen to his 
wife at his own expense, whether by visiting a private doctor or by 
using a special overnight mailing kit from a fertility lab, which his 
                                                          
 40. See id. at 617; Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990); Percy v. N.J. 
Dept. of Corrections, 651 A.2d 1044 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995); see also Pregnant 
Pause for Sperm Smuggling Wife, N.Y. POST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 6 (recounting the story 
of male prisoners, described as “New York mobsters,” who took matters into their own 
hands by bribing guards to ferry their semen to their wives and girlfriends).  In one 
case, a wife was also criminally implicated, and the state impounded the semen at her 
doctor’s office.  Id.  For related legal actions, see generally Anderson v. Vazquez, 827 
F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rejecting claims by death-row prisoners that their civil 
rights had been violated by the denial of conjugal visits and the opportunity to 
preserve their sperm, and see generally Katherine Bishop, Prisoners Sue to be 
Allowed to be Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, describing how the Virginia Supreme 
Court denied as frivolous two prisoners’ requests to have their semen frozen for their 
girlfriends. 
 41. Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 
291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 42. See infra notes 185-194 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882 (ruling that Gerber’s right to procreate survives 
incarceration). 
 44. See David Kravets, Inmate Has No Right To Mail Sperm from Prison, Court 
Rules, APWIRES, May 24, 2002 (declaring that Gerber was sentenced to life in prison 
under California’s three strikes law and noting that California excluded from 
conjugal visits prisoners serving life sentences and prisoners convicted of sex crimes 
or violent crimes against family members or minors). 
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attorney offered to pick up or which could be mailed directly from 
the prison.45  The court stopped short of saying that Gerber has a 
right to do as he wishes, although the decision implicitly anticipates 
this result.46  Finding that Gerber’s right to procreate survives 
imprisonment, based on precedents protecting prisoners’ fertility as 
well as marriage and abortion rights, the court remanded the case for 
factual development to find out whether abridging Gerber’s right to 
procreate satisfies the Turner test.47 
The three judges could not agree on the right at stake.  The 
majority broadly casts the right as the “right to procreate,”48  rejecting 
the district court’s formulation of Gerber’s claim as a “right to 
artificial insemination” per se (especially because Gerber wants to 
provide semen for his wife to be inseminated).49  The majority also 
takes issue with the dissent’s pithy characterization of the ruling as 
one upholding a “right to procreate from prison via FedEx.”50  This 
sort of semantic dispute has real consequences.  The close decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, for instance, shows the impact of narrowly 
framing a contested right.51  In that case, five Supreme Court Justices 
rejected the idea that the Constitution protects a specific “right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy.”52  In contrast, the dissent framed the 
issue in terms of a broad-based “right to privacy” that recognizes 
intimate relationships as central to personal identity and falling within 
a protected sphere of liberty.53  Both cases thus demonstrate the 
power of framing issues in the interpretation of constitutional rights. 
The State of California argued against granting Gerber’s request on 
gender equality grounds.  The state argued that if the prison 
                                                          
 45. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 885. 
 46. See id. at 892-93 (stating that Gerber’s right to procreate survives 
incarceration and remanding the case for evidentiary development). 
 47. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (protecting the right to 
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (asserting that procreation is “one 
of the basic civil rights of man”); Monmouth County Correctional Institutional 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding prisoners’ right to an 
abortion, subsidized by the state if necessary). 
 48. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 886 (deciding the constitutional right in the context 
of incarceration). 
 49. Id. at 886 n.3. 
 50. Id. at 888 n.6 (quoting Silverman, J., dissenting) (holding that finding a 
constitutional right for a prisoner to inseminate his wife would be “radical and 
unprecedented”). 
 51. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the State of 
Georgia’s sodomy statute did not impinge on any fundamental rights). 
 52. Id. at 190. 
 53. See id. at 217-18.  In 2003, the Court recognized a broader meaning of privacy 
when it struck down a statute criminalizing sodomy.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
9
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accommodated Gerber, it would also have to accommodate female 
prisoners who wanted to become pregnant through artificial 
insemination, thus straining the prisons’ resources.54  The equality 
argument originated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons in an earlier 
case from which Gerber departs.55  In that case, Steven Goodwin was a 
federal prisoner confined in Springfield, Missouri at the United States 
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners.  Goodwin sought to provide 
semen to his wife for the purpose of insemination, at his own expense, 
and suggested a variety of means to do so, on or off prison grounds, 
with or without the assistance of outside personnel.56  Prison staff 
rebuffed his initial requests by saying that the Bureau lacked a 
“program or provision” to implement his request.57  Goodwin 
appealed the decision, eventually taking his concerns to the federal 
courts, where a magistrate judge found that the Bureau’s “no policy” 
excuse violated Goodwin’s right to due process.58 
The Bureau’s executive staff then went to work, and came up with a 
policy statement opposing artificial insemination, seemingly on as 
many grounds as it could devise.59  Where the district court had 
found the right to procreate incompatible with incarceration, the 
Eighth Circuit found it need not reach that question, because it 
accepted the Bureau’s argument that accommodating Goodwin’s 
request violated its policy of treating prisoners equally—rich or poor, 
male or female.60  Indeed, the court almost seems to blame women 
for Goodwin’s plight: “male prisoners cannot be allowed to procreate 
while incarcerated because the Bureau cannot afford to expand its 
                                                          
 54. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890-91. 
 55. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that, 
assuming a fundamental right to procreation survives incarceration, state regulation 
restricting prisoner procreation is valid as reasonably related to the penological 
interest of treating male and female prisoners equally). 
 56. See id. at 1397 (enumerating his various suggestions in a pro se petition for 
writ of habeas corpus). 
 57. Id. at 1397. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 1397-98 (noting the Bureau’s concern that allowing prisoners 
to artificially inseminate someone would require either the development of collection 
and storage procedures for semen, or the acceptance of private medical persons to 
come in and collect the semen; both options would create security risks and add costs 
to the system).  Id.  The Bureau does not maintain any publicly available policy about 
insemination. My Freedom of Information Act appeal has been pending since January 
2003. 
 60. See id. at 1399 (finding the denial of Goodwin’s request to artificially 
inseminate his wife to be reasonably related to the goal of treating male and female 
prisoners equally).  The Court accepted the Bureau’s contention that if it allowed 
men to procreate while incarcerated, it would be required to provide the same 
services for women, which would necessitate an expensive expansion of medical 
services.  Id. at 1398. 
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medical services for its female prisoners.”61  The implication is that 
men cannot exercise their rights because women’s rights are so 
expensive and cumbersome.62 
The Ninth Circuit took a third tack, finding first that the right to 
procreate survives incarceration, but also that the right as asserted by 
Gerber does not implicate equality concerns.63  The Court noted that 
it could not “ignore the biological differences between men and 
women.”64  Because women and men are not similarly situated with 
respect to reproduction, the state’s “legitimate penological interest” in 
treating prisoners “equally to the extent possible” is simply not 
relevant.65 
The “dis/similarly situated” conundrum relates back to the 
question of the right at stake.66  Is it a generic right to procreate, in 
which a man’s interest will always be in impregnation and a woman’s 
will always be in conception?  Or, is it a right to procreate with a 
spouse in the free world, in which case other options may be possible?  
As the court observed, “a more apt parallel may be the question of 
whether a woman has the right to donate an egg to her lesbian 
partner or to a surrogate mother,” than a right to be inseminated 
herself.67 
In the end, women who want to press this kind of equal protection 
claim might not fare much better than men.  The state is likely to 
argue that just as pregnancy care imposes greater burdens on a 
prison’s budget and staff than sperm donation, so too does egg 
donation pose a greater burden.  Egg donation typically involves daily 
doses of fertility drugs or injections, requiring daily visits to the 
prison’s clinic, as well as an invasive procedure guided by an 
ultrasound machine to extract the eggs, a procedure which would 
likely have to be done at an off-site doctor’s office or facility.68  The 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 1400 (emphasis added). 
 62. See id. (begging the question as to whether women would have equal rights to 
similar treatment, given the intermediate standard of scrutiny applied to gender 
equality claims and the lower standard of scrutiny applied in prisoners’ rights claims). 
 63. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882 (noting the distinction between the two sexes in 
the context of artificial insemination; men provide their semen to women, and 
women are inseminated in order to become pregnant). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. (noting that because women cannot avail themselves of the 
opportunity sought by Gerber, the state’s policy of equal treatment is not implicated). 
 66. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s inability 
to agree on the constitutional right at stake). 
 67. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891 n.13. 
 68. See CHERYL L. MEYER, THE WANDERING UTERUS 24-25 (1997) (describing, 
generally, the medical procedures associated with egg donation). 
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majority’s framework assures that a female prisoner’s request would, 
at a minimum, be evaluated under the Turner standard of rational 
basis scrutiny.69  The Gerber court observed that a woman’s request 
for insemination was not before the court, and that the state could 
hardly deny the rights of one group because it might lead other 
groups to assert their rights.70 
While there is something appealing about the court’s approach and 
its willingness to look beyond the prevailing paradigm of women-as-
always-potentially-pregnant, the court nonetheless manages to strike a 
blow for gender equality.  The Gerber court relied on the 2001 
Supreme Court decision Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, which reified archaic, biologically-based gender stereotypes 
about men and women.71  Because of the underlying equality 
concerns, Nguyen brought forth a host of feminist lawyers and 
organizations to advocate on behalf of an unlikely beneficiary: Tuan 
Anh Nguyen, a young man who had been convicted of a sex offense 
and was facing deportation.72  Nguyen was born in Vietnam to a 
Vietnamese mother and an American father who were not married to 
each other.73  Joseph Boulais returned to the United States with his 
son Nguyen, but never filed the necessary paperwork for citizenship 
status.74 
Had Boulais been a mother instead of a father, he would not have 
had to do anything to gain U.S. citizenship for his son.  The child 
would automatically have been recognized as a U.S. citizen.75  In 
Nguyen, the Court upheld this unequal status quo by a five-to-four 
decision.76  The opinion inscribes a host of conventional gendered 
assumptions about parental responsibility under the guise of 
                                                          
 69. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that a statute making it more 
difficult for a child born abroad to become a U.S. citizen when only the father has 
United States citizenship did not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 72. See id. at 57. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 59-60. 
 75. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2004) (stipulating that United States citizenship 
will be automatically transmitted to a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen 
mother so long as the mother was a U.S. citizen at the time of the child’s birth, and 
had previously been physically present in the U.S. continuously for at least one year), 
with 8 U.S.C. §1409(a) (2004) (stipulating the requirements to gain U.S. citizenship 
for a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father, which include establishment 
of a blood relationship; paternity acknowledgement; and a written agreement to 
provide financially for the child). 
 76. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53. 
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“undeniable” biological differences.77  Because women are present at 
birth, the Court reasoned, they have a “unique opportunity” to 
develop a relationship with their child, a relationship which 
simultaneously creates ties to the United States.78  Men must take 
extra steps to demonstrate a parental attachment worthy of state 
recognition because men need not be present at birth, and their 
presence does not guarantee paternity.79 
Many observers worry that Nguyen will further weaken the already 
inferior equal protection consideration afforded to claims of sex 
discrimination.  Critics focus on two key stereotypes which the 
decision relies upon and reinforces.  First, the decision perpetuates 
the stereotype that women are naturally and automatically mothers, 
while men are fathers at their discretion.80  Linda Kerber identifies a 
further “ugly” subtext: the notion that women are “tricksters” from 
whom men need protection.  The legal system historically reinforced 
this stereotype by giving men the option of whether or not to 
acknowledge or “legitimate” their children born out of wedlock.81  
Both Catharine MacKinnon and Kerber see the Court as endorsing 
male irresponsibility, in essence giving men, especially military men, 
permission to “roam the world” fathering babies out of wedlock and 
abandoning them.82  The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of Nguyen is 
particularly troubling, suggesting a trade-off between enhanced 
procreative liberty for some men and equal protection of the laws for 
all women. 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 68. 
 78. See id. at 65 (noting that the opportunity for a meaningful relationship 
between a mother, who is a United States citizen, and her newborn child starts in the 
very event of childbirth because “the mother knows that the child is in being and is 
hers”). 
 79. See id. at 62 (noting that an affirmative step, confirming the parental 
relationship to the child, needs to be taken if the citizen parent is the father, but not 
if the citizen parent is the mother). 
 80. See Catharine MacKinnon, Can Fatherhood Be Optional?, N.Y. TIMES, June 
17, 2001, at 15 (arguing that the Court assumes that “to be a mother, you just have to 
be there; to be a father, you have to do things”).  But see an earlier challenge to 
gender-specific citizenship requirements, in which Justice Stevens described 
motherhood as a matter of conscious choice and work: 
If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the 
pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion—an alternative that 
is available by law to many, and in reality to most, women around the world. 
She must then actually give birth to the child. Section 1409(c) rewards that 
choice and that labor by conferring citizenship on her child. 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998).  (I am grateful to Sally Sheldon for 
alerting me to this passage). 
 81. Linda K. Kerber, Top Court Took a Step Backward on Gender Bias, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 23, 2001, at A14. 
 82. See MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 15. 
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When the Ninth Circuit reconsidered Gerber’s case en banc, a bare 
six-to-five majority held that the right to procreate is “fundamentally 
inconsistent” with incarceration, never reaching the equality 
question.83  Although Gerber did not seek “cohabitation, physical 
intimacy [or the opportunity to raise] children,” the majority focused 
single-mindedly on rulings that prisoners have no right to these 
aspects of marriage, and never evaluated the precise nature of 
Gerber’s request.84  Judge Tashima’s dissent dismantled this blind 
spot piece by piece, concluding that the majority failed to support its 
position with virtually any facts, and that the case should be remanded 
for evidentiary development.85  Both Judge Tashima and Judge 
Kozinski observed that by permitting some prisoners to have conjugal 
visits with their spouse, even as a matter of privilege, the legislature 
and Department of Corrections could not have intended to abrogate 
the right to procreate.86  Of the two, Judge Kozinski more pointedly 
argues that if banning reproduction is to be imposed as a form of 
punishment, then this is a decision for the legislature to make, not the 
warden, who has illegitimately added to Gerber’s punishment by 
cutting off his rights.87 
III. CONSTRAINING SEX AND REPRODUCTION ON THE OUTSIDE 
If prisoners’ assertions of their right to procreate rarely cross 
judges’ desks, a more common problem occurs when judges prohibit 
criminal defendants from even asserting such rights.  Coerced 
contraception erupted onto the public agenda when editorial and 
judicial entrepreneurs seized on the idea of using Norplant to 
temporarily sterilize women whose reproduction they deemed 
undesirable.88  For example, a judge in California “offered” Darlene 
                                                          
 83. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623 (concluding that it did not need to determine 
whether the prison’s refusal to grant the prisoner’s request was related to a valid 
penological interest). 
 84. Id. at 620-21. 
 85. See id. at 629. 
 86. See id. at 626-27 (inquiring how procreation can be per se fundamentally 
inconsistent with incarceration, as the majority asserted, if some prisoners are allowed 
conjugal visits). 
 87. See id. at 632 (arguing that judgments regarding prisoners’ rights to 
procreate “must be made by the legislature in setting the nature and degree of 
punishment for particular crimes”); cf. id. at 626 (highlighting that the California 
legislature has not enacted any statutes that prohibit artificial insemination by 
prisoners). 
 88. See, e.g., Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18 [hereinafter Underclass] (suggesting in an 
editorial that the government should offer “welfare mothers” financial incentives to 
use Norplant in order to “reduce the underclass”). 
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Johnson, accused of child abuse, a “choice” between seven years in 
prison or one year in the local jail, followed by the implantation of 
Norplant.89  Although Johnson was certainly responsible for hitting 
her children, once she entered the courtroom as a single, pregnant, 
African American mother of four who had received Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), she could not control becoming 
a symbol for many of the highly charged political debates of the day.90  
Just a few months later, sixty percent of respondents told public 
opinion pollsters that they approved of mandating Norplant for “drug 
abusing women of childbearing age.”91  Much of the commentary has 
focused on the Norplant cases as a result of this publicity, but the 
introduction of Norplant merely facilitated the imposition—and 
enforcement—of sentences judges had already been handing down 
for at least twenty-five years, including sentences imposed on men.92 
As with so many highly contested forms of reproductive control, we 
simply do not know how often judges bar probationers from sex or 
procreation.  American Law Reports describes only eleven such 
decisions.93  These decisions represent cases that went up for 
                                                          
 89. See Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725-26 
(Cal. 1998) (describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson, in which 
the judge ordered that the defendant submit to a Norplant birth-control implant as a 
condition of probation (citing People v. Johnson, No. F015316, 1992 WL 685375 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992))).  Norplant is a hormonal contraceptive lasting five years that is 
implanted in a woman’s upper arm and requires removal by a health professional.  
See also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 105-06 (1997). 
 90. See Underclass, supra note 88, at A18 (suggesting financial incentives for 
welfare recipients to use Norplant); ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 151-52 (noting the 
public stir that arose regarding the Darlene Johnson case); see also Catherine R. 
Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare 
Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473 (1995) 
(analyzing the constitutionality of legislative proposals to link Norplant use to welfare 
benefits). 
 91. George Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll: Most Support 
Norplant for Teens, Drug Addicts, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at Part A.  But see Lynn 
M. Paltrow & Robert Newman, Treatment, Not Sterilization, Is the Way To Help 
Addicted Moms, NATIONAL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, (debunking myths 
about substance abuse and drug-exposed babies), available at 
http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/oped.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2004). 
 92. See Toni Driver Saunders, Comment, Banning Motherhood: An RX To 
Combat Child Abuse?, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 203 (1994).  The law review literature on 
coerced contraception is voluminous and almost exclusively concerned with 
restrictions imposed on women.  Id.  A great deal of the literature was written in the 
early 1990’s and centers on Darlene Johnson’s case, though other articles offer 
particularly helpful reviews of a large number of cases.  Id.  See also  Stacey L. Arthur, 
The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or Crime Control?, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 43 (1992). 
 93. See John C. Williams, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant’s 
Remaining Childless or Having No Additional Children During Probationary Period, 
94 A.L.R.3d 1218 (2004) (recounting and analyzing cases requiring a defendant to 
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appellate review, not cases where judges withdrew their orders or 
where defendants did not appeal.94  The prospect of jail time no 
doubt has a chilling effect on the pursuit of appeals.  As Stacey Arthur 
notes, because cases like these may not be reported, “those that do 
not receive significant media attention can easily go unnoticed.”95 
Laurence Tribe seconds this observation, stating that the conditions 
are “frequently imposed” but rarely reviewed.96  My own research 
finds that since 1966, cases have been reported by the press or the 
courts in at least twenty-one states: Arizona, California, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.97  A judge 
in New York imposed a ban on reproduction as a form of punishment 
in 2004, an apparent first for the Northeast.98  In Florida, judges from 
around the state continued to issue such orders even after an 
appellate court struck one down in 1979.99  Trial level courts seem to 
be doing the same in Ohio.100  The Missouri and Pennsylvania cases 
are unusual because federal district court judges issued the 
controversial orders.101  In a number of these states, judges have also 
“offered” or ordered chemical or surgical castration to men convicted 
                                                          
refrain from having future children). 
 94. See Mark Curriden, Sterilization Ordered for Child Abuser: From Tennessee 
to Texas, Judges Order Procedure When Defendants Volunteer, 79 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 
(May 1993). 
 95. Arthur, supra note 92, at 6 n.19. 
 96. See Oakley v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 813 (2002), petition for cert. filed, 2001 WL 
34116641, at 27-30 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2001) (No. 01-1573). 
 97. See infra notes 156-57, 169-71, 213-25 and accompanying text; see also 
Involuntary Birth Control Is a Too-Simple Solution, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, 
Apr. 5, 1994, at A6 (describing a situation in North Carolina where a lawyer 
representing children who were removed from their mother’s custody asked a judge 
to order the woman to use Norplant). 
 98. See Marc Santora, Negligent Upstate Couple Is Told Not To Procreate, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at B6. 
 99. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding 
invalid the appellant’s probation term prohibiting her from pregnancy); see also 
Judge Finds No Legal Precedent for Ordering Contraception, UNITED PRESS INT’L, 
Nov. 14, 1992 (reporting that a Florida judge said he could find no legal precedent to 
order a woman to be implanted with birth control, when a local advocacy group asked 
that he do so). 
 100. See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (holding 
that prohibiting the defendant from having children during her five-year probation 
period was a violation of her constitutional right to privacy and a violation of the trial 
court’s discretion). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing 
the district court’s order that the defendant not conceive another child with a woman 
besides his wife unless he could show that he was supporting his existing children). 
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of sex offenses.102  Although other writers often treat all of these cases 
as a set, I distinguish them, because judges order castration for the 
purpose of preventing sexual assault, not to prevent procreation, 
although that will also follow.  Legislatures have had little to say about 
these issues.  The exception is Illinois, which enacted a law to prohibit 
judges from requiring birth control as a condition of probation in 
1993; an appellate court subsequently ruled that the statute bans 
requiring abstinence, which is a form of birth control.103 
As a purely technical matter, not all of these cases involved outright 
bans on procreation, but they all raise questions about judicial 
discretion and power.  For instance, in 1988, an Indiana judge made it 
clear that while he could not order a woman to be sterilized, he would 
be more inclined to give her a shorter sentence if she underwent the 
procedure: “She has no need for any more children.  I can’t order 
this, but she could consider sterilization.  It would be a mitigating 
circumstance.”104  Melody Baldwin, who pleaded guilty to child 
neglect after facing a murder charge in the death of her four-year-old 
son, was pregnant when she appeared before the judge.  She 
complied with his “suggestion,” undergoing sterilization after giving 
birth, and the judge sentenced her to ten years out of a possible 
twenty in prison.105  Afterwards, Baldwin said that she sometimes 
regretted her decision, but “it was the only way.”106  In another case in 
1993, a Texas judge “went to great lengths,” according to the news 
report, “to have Alice Faye Byrd acknowledge she was accepting 
Norplant voluntarily and not as a result of coercion to end her six-
month stay” in the county jail.107  “But,” the account continues, the 
judge “also made it clear to Byrd, 29, that he was ‘not inclined to give 
[her] probation if [she didn’t] agree’ to the contraceptive 
measure.”108 
                                                          
 102. See, e.g., Julianne Malveaux, Wrong Answer To Rape, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 
1992, at A10 (discussing a judge’s offer to a man accused of sexual assaulting a child 
to choose between castration or more than twenty years in prison). 
 103. See People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ill. App. 4d 1995) (interpreting 
the statutory language that prohibits courts from imposing any form of birth control 
as a condition of probation). 
 104. Judge Says Sterilization May Ease Sentence for Child’s Death, APWIRES, July 
21, 1988. 
 105. See Woman Who Was Sterilized for Lighter Sentence Says She’s Angry, 
ASSOCPR, Nov. 15, 1988, available at 1988 WL 3823085. 
 106. Id. 
 107. John Makeig, Woman’s Probation Includes Birth Control: Mother, Whose 
Abandoned 4-Year-Old Died in Blaze, Accepts Norplant, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1993, 
at 21. 
 108. Id.; see also Department of Corrections Debates Judge’s Order To Pay for 
Tubal Ligation, APWIRES, Aug. 8, 2000 (describing a Pennsylvania case where a 
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These cases highlight the fine line between coercion and “choice” 
when someone confronts the power of the state.  With their freedom 
on the line, defendants in criminal cases are extremely vulnerable to 
“suggestions” that they sacrifice their sexuality, bodily integrity, and 
reproductive intentions for the future, allowing judges to structure 
defendants’ lives under the guise of “voluntary” decisions. 
Many commentators understandably fear that these probation 
conditions will be directed at poor women of color, and some go 
further to say that judges do primarily impose reproductive conditions 
on this group.109  This can be a difficult claim to verify because the 
individuals who have appealed their sentences have not done so on 
the basis of race discrimination, thus court opinions and news reports 
rarely discuss a defendant’s racial identity.  It seems plausible that 
some of the women about whom we lack information are white, such 
as methamphetamine users.110  News photographs and interviews with 
lawyers have provided information in some cases, as well as the 
occasional judicial cue: one opinion about a man ordered not to have 
children out of wedlock cites statistics on the number of Black 
children in poverty, strongly suggesting that the defendant in that 
case was African American.111 
Even absent systematic racial data, however, several historical and 
contemporary trends lend weight to the speculation that the 
restrictions fall most heavily on poor women of color.  First, the 
history of coercive sterilization in this country has been dominated 
since mid-century by sterilization abuse of African American, Native 
American, and Puerto Rican women.112  Second, because of the 
                                                          
judge acknowledged that he could not order a woman to be sterilized and said that 
the procedure would not affect her sentence, but also described sterilization as 
something “positive” for the woman to tell the parole board).  He ordered the state 
Department of Corrections to pay for the operation if the woman asked for the 
operation.  Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Long-Term Contraceptives in the Criminal Justice 
System, in COERCED CONTRACEPTION? MORAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF LONG-ACTING 
BIRTH CONTROL 134-50 (Ellen Moskowitz & Bruce Jennings eds., 1996); ROBERTS, 
supra note 89, at 196.  See generally Michelle Oberman, Commentary: The Control 
of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6 
n.24 (1992). 
 110. See Fox Butterfield, Across Rural America, Drug Casts a Grim Shadow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, at 10  (reporting that “federal surveys have consistently shown 
that methamphetamine is largely a drug of whites, the less affluent, and those living 
in rural areas and west of the Mississippi [River]”). 
 111. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir.1992) (relating that 
“[i]n 1987, 48.1% of black children under six lived below the poverty line”). 
 112. See ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS 
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 95-125 (1995) (describing the history of eugenics and 
forced sterilization); see also Judge Says He Wishes He Could Order Woman 
Sterilized, APWIRES, Oct. 12, 2000 (describing a federal judge’s comments to a 
18
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss3/1
  
2004]    NO NEW BABIES?  GENDER INEQUALITY IN PRISON SYSTEMS 409 
“racial distribution of poverty,” Black and Latina women are more 
likely to receive public assistance, experience greater intervention 
from child protective services, and/or live in poor neighborhoods 
that are heavily policed to detect drug activity, all of which bring them 
into contact with state actors who may pressure them not to have 
children.113  African American women have borne the brunt of 
criminal prosecution for using drugs during pregnancy.114  And, 
finally, the rhetoric of “illegitimate children,” “irresponsibility,” and 
“welfare dependence” that laces judicial and public commentary is 
certainly racially coded, regardless of the specific case in which it is 
deployed.115 
IV. PROHIBITING PROCREATION: A CLOSELY CONTESTED DECISION 
Wisconsin v. Oakley is especially significant because it is the only 
case barring procreation to have survived the scrutiny of a court of last 
resort.116  In a universe of cursory opinions, the Oakley case also 
stands out for its depth of analysis and for the acrimony between the 
majority and the dissent.  The case pits a bloc of male justices who 
claim the mantle of advocate for poor women and children, the “true 
victims” in this case, whose needs the dissenters “diminish,” against a 
bloc of female justices who see danger in their brethren’s reasoning 
and actions.117 
The State of Wisconsin charged David Oakley with the crime of 
intentional failure to pay child support.118  Oakley is the father of 
nine children with four different women.119  He worked out a plea 
bargain, which included a three-year prison sentence and a stayed 
eight-year sentence.120  In addition, the judge ordered Oakley to 
spend five years on probation, during which he could not father any 
children “unless he demonstrates that he ha[s] the ability to support 
them and that he is supporting the children he already ha[s].”121  
                                                          
Navajo woman in New Mexico sentenced to prison for child abuse). 
 113. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 138 (1998).  See generally DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (discussing the 
negative impact of child welfare intervention on African American families). 
 114. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 89; Rachel Roth, The Perils of Pregnancy: 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 149 (2002). 
 115. See MINK, supra note 113 (discussing the racial politics of welfare policy). 
 116. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02. 
 117. See Tamar Lewin, Father Owing Child Support Loses a Right to Procreate, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A14. 
 118. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201 (stating the charges against the defendant). 
 119. See id. (describing the case’s factual background). 
 120. See id. at 203 (listing the case’s procedural history). 
 121. Id. 
19
Roth: "No New Babies?" Gender Inequality and Reproductive Control in th
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004
  
410 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:3 
Oakley challenged this provision of his sentence.122 
It is worth noting at the outset that a few months after the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court reached its decision in the case, the court 
denied Oakley’s motion for reconsideration.  At that time, the Chief 
Justice, joined by the other two women on the court, issued a 
concurring opinion to clarify two significant facts.123  First, Oakley was 
completely delinquent in his support payment for a period of 
precisely four months, months during which he was employed and 
could have made payments.124  Most of the time, he did pay at least 
some child support, “in excess of” seventy percent of his 
obligations.125  While consistently shirking on thirty percent of his 
payments and being $25,000 in arrears does not make Oakley an 
angel, this information paints a different picture than the majority’s 
discussion of his “persistent refusal to pay a cent to his children.”126 
Second, the opinion withdraws references made by the majority to 
Oakley’s intimidation of one of his own children at another trial, and 
to Oakley having abused at least one of his own children.127  This 
correction is particularly significant given that the majority decision is 
replete with references to “child victims” and “victimizing.”128  The 
language of the decision seems to conflate physical abuse and non-
support: “[I]t is overwhelmingly obvious that any child he fathers in 
the future is doomed to a future of neglect, abuse, or worse.  That as 
yet unborn child is a victim from the day it is born.”129  Alongside the 
various references to intimidation, this conflation makes it easy for the 
reader to construe Oakley as violent and dangerous, on top of being 
irresponsible and unfair.  For some, the depiction of Oakley as 
abusive may lend at least moral support to the requirement not to 
have more children.130 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the no-more-children condition in a 
                                                          
 122. See id. (presenting a constitutional challenge to the terms of his probation). 
 123. See State v. Oakley, 635 N.W.2d 760, 760-62 (Wis. 2001) (denying the 
defendant’s motion for reconsideration and presenting a justice’s concurring opinion 
outlining key facts in the case). 
 124. See id. at 761. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213 n.28. 
 127. See Oakley, 635 N.W.2d at 760 (removing this language from its opinion). 
 128. See, e.g., Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208. 
 129. Id. at 215. 
 130. See generally Katherine E. McCanna, Note, A Hot Debate in the Summer of 
2001: State v. Oakley’s Excessive Intrusion on Procreative Rights, 36 IND. L. REV. 857 
(2003) (arguing that the decision will lead to increased efforts by courts to curtail 
procreative rights in certain situations). 
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brief, unsigned, unpublished opinion.131  The court found the 
probation condition to be “narrowly drawn” and “reasonably related 
to Oakley’s rehabilitation and protection of the public,” satisfying 
constitutional standards.132  The court completely glosses over the 
role of women in carrying out the terms of probation: “Oakley’s 
condition of probation does not prohibit him from engaging in 
sexual activity.  It merely prohibits Oakley from having additional 
children whom he cannot support, a task at which Oakley has wholly 
failed and for which he has been held criminally liable.”133 
What lies between the freedom to engage in sexual activity and the 
requirement not to have children is necessarily birth control.  Unless 
Oakley has a vasectomy, this burden ultimately falls on women.  That 
is, because no method of birth control is perfect, a woman may get 
pregnant despite diligent efforts at using contraception.134  As the 
Eighth Circuit recognized in a related case, “[s]hort of having a 
probation officer follow [him] twenty-four hours a day, there is no way 
to prevent [him] from fathering more children.”135  No way, that is, 
except by exerting pressure on any sex partner Oakley should happen 
to impregnate. As Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Bradley puts it: 
Because the condition is triggered only upon the birth of a child, 
the risk of imprisonment creates a strong incentive for a man in 
Oakley’s position to demand from the woman the termination of 
her pregnancy.  It places the woman in an untenable position: have 
an abortion or be responsible for Oakley going to prison for eight 
years.  Creating an incentive to procure an abortion in order to 
comply with conditions of probation is a result that I am not 
prepared to foster.136 
Bradley’s concern is one of several issues that divided the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in this case.  The court split four-to-three along 
gender lines: all the men upheld the terms of Oakley’s probation, and 
all the women dissented.137  This result may initially be surprising, 
given that women belong to the class most affected by the lack of 
child support.  But where the majority sees women primarily as victims 
                                                          
 131. See State v. Oakley, 619 N.W. 2d 308 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000), aff’d, 629 N.W.2d 
200 (Wis. 2001). 
 132. Id. at 6. 
 133. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 134. See, e.g., Facts About Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (demonstrating 
the effectiveness rates for various forms of birth control, concluding that, with the 
exception of abstinence, no method is absolutely fail-safe), at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/bc/bcfacts2.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
 135. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 136. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 200. 
21
Roth: "No New Babies?" Gender Inequality and Reproductive Control in th
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004
  
412 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:3 
of men’s wrongdoing, as damsels in economic distress, the dissenters 
present a more complicated picture of gender, accountability, and 
reproductive politics. 
Returning to the abortion question, the majority does not take 
Bradley’s concern seriously enough to address.  Justice Wilcox merely 
chides Bradley for invoking the “specter” of coercive abortion, in one 
of the many footnotes where they battle with each other.138  Yet 
Bradley is hardly the first judge to be troubled by this possibility.139  
The majority’s insensitivity to possible coercion is curious given the 
way the majority positions itself as the true champion of women. 
The larger implications of the decision also divide the court.  The 
majority accuses the dissenters of defending “Oakley’s absolute right 
to procreate children while refusing to support them,” as if they are 
callously indifferent to the plight of poor, single-mother families.140  
The dissenting justices are not oblivious to the fact that women suffer 
disproportionately when non-custodial parents abdicate their 
obligations.141  But their concerns transcend the particulars of 
Oakley’s case; as Bradley puts it, “[W]e must keep in mind what is 
really at stake in this case.  The fundamental right to have children, 
shared by us all, is damaged by today’s decision.”142  The majority’s 
own presentation of data on parents who fail to pay child support 
“belies its contention that this case is truly exceptional;” instead, it has 
the potential to affect thousands of men in the state.143  Justice Sykes 
also objects to what she calls “a compulsory, state-sponsored, court-
enforced financial test for future parenthood.”144  She agrees that the 
state’s “objective of collecting past and future support for [Oakley’s] 
children, who are entitled to and need it” is “significant and 
laudable,” but the means cannot stand when less restrictive 
alternatives are available, such as imposing jail time with work release 
for mandatory employment, garnishing wages, and intercepting tax 
returns.145 
Ultimately, conditioning parenthood on any sort of state criteria 
                                                          
 138. See id. at 215 n.34 (arguing that Bradley’s dissent intentionally circumvents 
the real issue). 
 139. See, e.g., Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Zaring 
v. California, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 270 (Ct. App. 1992); Kansas v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 
313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365. 
 140. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208 n.22. 
 141. See id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 221 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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may, as Bradley says, “affect the rights of every citizen in this state, 
man or woman, rich or poor.”146  Although this particular decision 
restricts and penalizes men, it cannot do so without implicating 
women.  The dissenting opinions do not draw out all of the 
connections, but we can fill them in: the history of reproductive 
politics makes clear that women bear the brunt of scorn heaped on 
parents deemed too poor to have children, and women have borne 
the brunt of coercive measures directed at discouraging both sexes 
from reproducing, including unwilling and unwitting sterilization.147 
V. A MISFORTUNE OR A CRIME? COURT ORDERS PROHIBITING 
PROCREATION148 
At the time the Wisconsin Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
Oakley, only two other appellate courts had upheld sexual or 
reproductive restrictions on men, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
relied on them both.  In 1997, a Wisconsin court upheld a probation 
condition imposed on Kenneth Krebs, convicted of sexually assaulting 
his daughter.149  For twenty years, Krebs must receive approval from 
his probation officer before engaging in a “dating, intimate, or 
sexual” relationship, and the probation officer must verify that Krebs 
seeks only the companionship of adult women who are aware of his 
criminal record.150  The officer who testified about the condition 
called it a “rule” and made it sound routine rather than a condition 
imposed uniquely on Krebs, suggesting that other men may leave 
similar restrictions unchallenged.  The court found the condition 
reasonably related to Krebs’ rehabilitation and protective of public 
safety, and rejected Krebs’ claim that it interfered with his right to 
procreate.151 
Across the country in Oregon, a court upheld a three-year 
condition imposed on Tad Kline, convicted of child abuse, after he 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Jennifer Foote Sweeney, Something Cheesy in the State of Wisconsin, 
SALON.COM (July 13, 2001) (describing the implications for reproductive rights), at 
http://dir.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/07/13/wisconsin/index.html (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2004).  See generally CAROLE MCCANN, BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1916-45 (1994) (describing the “economic ethic of fertility” that 
influenced birth control politics in the early twentieth century). 
 148. See Dominguez v. California, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating 
that becoming pregnant while unmarried is a misfortune, not a crime, and striking an 
order not to have children outside of marriage). 
 149. See generally Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
 150. See id. at 27-28. 
 151. See id. at 28 (holding that the condition restricts a constitutional right, but 
does not deny a right). 
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violated his probation.152  In order to father another child, Kline must 
successfully complete drug treatment, anger management, and any 
other required program, and must get prior written approval from the 
court.153  The court found that the condition does not totally 
eliminate Kline’s reproductive rights and it protects potential victims 
from injury.154  In all these cases, a woman’s pregnancy and/or the 
birth of a child would provide evidence that the man had violated the 
conditions of his probation.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court dissenters 
distinguished these two cases from Oakley’s because they do not 
condition sex or reproduction on the basis of financial criteria.155 
As the cases above suggest, courts imposed sexual and reproductive 
restrictions on men for two reasons: child abuse156 and failure to 
support their children financially.157  This second category is fairly 
broad.  One man was convicted of intentionally refusing to pay child 
support.158  Another had broken into a grocery store to steal food in 
                                                          
 152. See generally Oregon v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 153. See id. at 699. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority in this case cites no cases where a court has allowed the right to have 
children to be conditioned on financial status). 
 156. See Smith v. Arizona, 725 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Ariz. 1986) (finding that the lower 
court did not have the power to order the defendant to be sterilized after his 
conviction for child abuse); Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1982) (reversing the lower court’s probation condition prohibiting the 
defendant from fathering a child after his conviction for negligent child abuse); 
Kline, 963 P.2d at 699 (finding the defendant’s conviction for first degree criminal 
mistreatment of his child allowed for a condition prohibiting him from fathering any 
more children); Krebs, 568 N.W.2d at 28 (holding that the defendant’s conviction for 
sexual abuse of his daughter warranted a restriction on his right to engage in a sexual 
relationship). 
 157. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (upholding a ban on procreation as a 
condition of probation); United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(reversing an order not to have children outside of marriage); Burchell v. State, 419 
So. 2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (striking a ban on procreation but not specifying 
the nature of the man’s crime); Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (reversing a lower court decision requiring marriage and forbidding 
extramarital sex by the defendants, who were all parents and who were all convicted 
of burglary or forging checks); see also Judge Orders Drug Dealer To Halt Sex for 5 
Years, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1988, at 13 (describing an order by a federal judge that 
Michael Youngblood not have sex for five years), available at 1988 WL 3433037; Larry 
Copeland, Does ‘Scarlet Letter’ Judge Cross the Line?, USA TODAY, July 9, 2001, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/07/10/texas-judge.htm 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (describing the case of Robert Torres, who was convicted 
of statutory rape in 1999, and subsequently fathered children with two teenage girls, 
children he did not appear to be supporting).  At a probation revocation hearing in 
2001, the judge ordered Torres not to have sex outside of marriage.  Id.  According to 
Torres’ attorney, he later married, rendering the order moot.  See Email from Gerald 
A. Rogen, Attorney at Law, to Rachel Roth, Research Fellow, Ibis Reproductive Health 
(Mar. 1, 2004) (on file with author).  Cases arising after Oakley are discussed in the 
conclusion.  Infra notes 213-25 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202. 
24
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss3/1
  
2004]    NO NEW BABIES?  GENDER INEQUALITY IN PRISON SYSTEMS 415 
order to, in the state’s words, “feed and care for [his] illegitimate 
children.”159  The crime that brought this man before the court was 
not failure to pay support, but the court took it as evidence that he 
was unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities.  Another man was 
sentenced not to have children out of wedlock (more specifically not 
to impregnate any woman not his wife, while leaving unclear the 
question of whether he had a wife) until he proved he was supporting 
his children.160  His crime: intent to sell drugs, something completely 
unrelated to child support. 
Five of the eight courts to review impositions on men found them 
unacceptable. Two Florida courts overturned the restrictions because 
they did not consider them reasonably related to past or future 
criminal activity, they impinged on non-criminal conduct, and they 
coerced marriage by banning non-marital sex or procreation.161  The 
Arizona Supreme Court found the imposition of sterilization in a 
child abuse case outside the judge’s jurisdiction.162  The Eighth 
Circuit found a ban on impregnation unworkable, counterproductive 
(because a father remanded to prison cannot support his children), 
and outside the trial judge’s authority.163  Few courts took the step to 
analyze the constitutional right to procreate, because they could 
overturn the conditions on other grounds.164 
Like unworkability, ambiguity bothered one court: a third Florida 
court found that a ban on “fathering” children could have two 
meanings—”begetting” and parenting.165  Because the defendant was 
already prohibited from rearing or even being near children, the state 
could prevent him from abusing any future children he happened to 
“father” in the procreative sense.  In another case, Michael 
Youngblood may have seen no need to appeal a judge’s order to 
“obey all local, state and federal laws [pertaining to] fornication and 
bastardy,” because Pennsylvania had repealed those laws and there 
                                                          
 159. See Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 47 (relaying the state’s argument that the 
condition is reasonable and serves a useful rehabilitative purpose). 
 160. See Smith, 972 F.2d at 962. 
 161. See Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48 (holding that although the punishment 
intended to alleviate the financial pressure on the appellants convicted of forgery, it 
was nevertheless invalid); Burchell, 419 So. 2d at 358. 
 162. See Smith v. State, 725 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that courts can 
only order sterilization as a condition of sentencing under specific statutory 
authority). 
 163. See Smith, 972 F.2d at 962. 
 164. But see id. at 962 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and 
observing the importance of the right to have offspring). 
 165. See Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
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were no federal ones with which to contend.166  In Youngblood, a 
federal judge ordered the defendant not to have sex for five years, but 
made no provisions for enforcing the order.167  A Texas case was not 
reviewed because the defendant, ordered not to have sex outside of 
wedlock, got married.168 
Courts have imposed reproductive restrictions on women for 
primarily three reasons: child abuse and neglect,169 drug use,170 and 
                                                          
 166. See Judge Orders Drug Dealer To Halt Sex for 5 Years, supra note 157, at 13. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Email from Gerald A. Rogen, supra note 157. 
 169. See Smith v. State, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) (overturning sterilization as 
condition of reduced prison sentence); Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (overturning 
ban on pregnancy); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 7 (overturning ban on pregnancy and 
marriage); Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1335 (overturning ban on having children); see 
also Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725-26 (Cal. 1998) 
(describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1992), at 1992 WL 685375, in which the judge ordered Norplant; 
appeal mooted when defendant sent to prison for violating other probation 
conditions); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. 1995) (overturning ban on 
pregnancy but upholding pregnancy testing); Trammel, 751 N.E.2d at 283 
(overturning ban on pregnancy); Mosburg, 768 P.2d at 313 (overturning ban on 
pregnancy); In re Lacey P., 433 S.E.2d 518 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that a judge’s 
order to be sterilized was mooted when the woman obtained Norplant); Dresser, 
supra note 109, at 136 (describing a 1990 Florida case where a judge ordered use of 
contraceptives as part of plea arrangement); Id. at 137 (describing a Tennessee case 
where the judge “offered” a lighter sentence for a married couple accused of child 
sexual abuse if the woman agreed to be sterilized); Arthur, supra note 92, at 19-21 
(citing Nebraska v. Carlton, No. CR90-1937 (Neb. County Ct., 1991), in which the 
judge ordered use of birth control); Saunders, supra note 92, at 214 n.28 (describing 
an Arizona case overturning in 1988 a lifetime of compulsory birth control); Jeff 
Feeley, Woman Accepts Sterilization as Term of Plea: Charged with Murdering Her 
Child, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, and Sterilized Woman Pleads Guilty To 
Manslaughter, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 22, 1986 (describing a South Carolina case 
where a woman underwent sterilization as part of a plea bargain); Florida: Judge 
Overturns State Adoption “Gag Rule”, 5 ABORTION REP., July 23, 1993 (describing a 
Florida case where a judge ordered a woman to use Norplant); Judge Orders Mother 
To Be Given Contraceptive, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 6, 1991 (describing a Texas 
case in which a woman obtained Norplant as part of a plea bargain to avoid prison); 
Judge Says Sterilization May Ease Sentence for Child’s Death, APWIRES, July 21, 1988 
(describing an Indiana case where the judge suggested leniency in exchange for 
sterilization); Makeig, Women’s Probation Includes Birth Control, supra note 107, at 
21 (describing a Texas case where a woman “agreed” to use Norplant); John Makeig, 
Surgical Deterrent: Mom Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-Control Implant Over 
Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1992 (describing a Texas case where woman obtained 
Norplant to avoid prison); Medical Sterilization Ordered for Abusive Louisiana 
Mother, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 12, 2000, at A14 (describing a Louisiana case where a 
judge ordered sterilization or ten years in prison); Retarded Woman Agrees To 
Norplant Instead of Jail, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 1994 (describing a 
Pennsylvania case); Estela Villanueva, Forced Contraception Protested: Legislator 
Pushes Bill To Ban Courts from Ordering Use of Birth Control by Women, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1993 (describing an Illinois case where a woman “accepted” 
a sentence including Norplant).  In two additional cases of child abuse, judges did 
not ban pregnancy but did order women to submit to regular pregnancy tests.  See 
Harriet Chiang, Monthly Pregnancy Test Ordered: Woman’s Children Have Alcohol-
Related Defects, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 1995, at A19 (describing a California case where 
a judge ordered pregnancy tests); Laura Griffin, Mother Pleads in Newborn’s Death, 
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criminal activity not directly related to children.171  In child abuse 
cases, by far the largest category, judges ordered women not to have 
more children.172  In cases of theft or check fraud, however, judges 
ordered women not to have children or sex outside of marriage.173  
No woman was restricted because she failed to pay child support, but 
judges’ disapproval of women who rely on public assistance to support 
their children came into play in sentencing decisions.174 
Appellate courts found many reasons to overturn these restrictions: 
because they bear no direct relationship to the crime;175 they restrict 
non-criminal conduct, or coerce conduct (marriage);176 they are 
                                                          
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 9, 1993, at 1B (describing a Florida case where a judge 
ordered pregnancy tests or proof of birth control). Cases arising after Oakley are 
discussed infra in the conclusion. 
 170. See Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263 (overturning ban on pregnancy); State v. 
Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (overturning birth control or 
sterilization as condition of probation); Court Removes Another ‘No Pregnancy’ 
Order, APWIRES, July 3, 2001 (describing two cases where the Montana Supreme 
Court overturned bans on pregnancy; in one case, the court upheld required 
pregnancy tests). 
 171. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (overturning ban on pregnancy outside 
of marriage); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (overturning 
ban on pregnancy outside of marriage); Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 46 (overturning ban 
on extramarital sex in three consolidated the cases of two women and one man); 
State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (overturning ban on pregnancy 
outside of marriage). 
 172. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (overturning the trial court’s order 
that a woman refrain from conceiving a child during her probation period).  The 
probation order stemmed from the woman’s felony conviction of child 
endangerment.  Id. at 359. 
 173. See, e.g., Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (considering the trial court’s 
probation order, which included the condition that the female defendant, who was 
convicted of robbery, not become pregnant without being married). 
 174. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 267 (highlighting the sentencing judge’s 
comments to the defendant regarding two of her children’s receipt of public funds, 
when ordering her to refrain from becoming pregnant while on probation); see also 
Gregory A. Hall, Judge To Rule Today on No-Sex Plea Deal, COURIER-JOURNAL, May 
13, 2002 (describing a Kentucky case from 1993, where the judge told a woman jailed 
on charges of failure to pay child support that her release from jail was contingent on 
getting a tubal ligation; the judge later suggested that he only meant to “get her 
attention,” and the county clerk’s office has no record of appeal). 
 175. See, e.g., Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114 (invalidating the no-pregnancy 
condition of probation, in part, because it bears no relationship to the defendant’s 
convictions for grand theft and battery); Norman, 484 So. 2d at 953 (vacating the 
probation condition set by the trial court, which required the defendant to refrain 
from giving birth to any “illegitimate” children for two years, because the order failed 
to relate to the goal of rehabilitating the defendant).  But see Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 
at 364 (finding the trial court’s no-pregnancy restriction reasonably related to the 
crime of child endangerment,  because the defendant adhered to a strict macrobiotic 
diet for herself and her children, and such a diet might compromise healthy fetal 
development, should she become pregnant). 
 176. See, e.g., Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48 (asserting that an order prohibiting 
unmarried individuals from engaging in sexual intercourse with anyone other than 
spouses coerces them into marriage); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9 (invalidating 
probation conditions prohibiting pregnancy and marriage unless probationers 
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impermissibly overbroad in their violation of constitutional rights;177 
they cannot be enforced;178 or they fall outside the judge’s authority, 
and in some cases reflect judges’ personal biases.179  A Florida 
appellate court said simply that the condition is “so grossly erroneous 
on its face [that] in the interest of justice we must strike it.”180  
Compared to cases about men, the greater number of courts focusing 
on privacy and procreative liberty could be simply a function of the 
greater number of cases.  It might also be, however, because of the 
social construction of motherhood as more central to women’s 
identity than fatherhood is to men’s.  That is, restrictions on 
motherhood may call for greater reflection and justification because 
motherhood is such a defining aspect of women’s lives in American 
culture.181  A related issue here is the courts’ concern with the 
practical implication of such orders, specifically the concern that if a 
woman becomes pregnant, she would be forced to hide her 
pregnancy and forego prenatal care, or to seek an abortion, 
something the courts (and some prosecutors) found unacceptable.182 
Significant differences emerge when comparing the cases about 
women and men.  First, the record shows that judges are more likely 
to impose reproductive restrictions on women than men.183  Second, 
judges are more likely to impose these restrictions on women in cases 
where the crime had no direct connection to children.184  Two 
                                                          
obtained the trial court’s consent because the condition pertained to non-criminal 
conduct). 
 177. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 366 (finding the probation order that 
prohibited female defendant from conceiving unconstitutionally overbroad because 
less restrictive alternatives were available to meet the same rehabilitative purpose).  
The court noted that probation orders may be valid even though they infringe on an 
individual’s constitutional rights, when required by the circumstances.  Id. at 363.  See 
also Trammel, 751 N.E.2d at 289-90 (invalidating the probation condition that 
ordered the defendant not to become pregnant because it violated her privacy right 
of procreation). 
 178. See Arthur, supra note 92, at 20 (noting where a judge conceded to the 
unenforceability of a mandatory contraception order). 
 179. See, e.g., Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93 (overturning a trial court’s no-
pregnancy probation order, which, in part, reflected the trial judge’s bias against 
using public assistance to help “irresponsible” mothers). 
 180. Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114. 
 181. See Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S 
STUD. 15, 49 (1992) (discussing various theories of why motherhood is so central to 
women’s lives in American culture). 
 182. See supra note 139 (listing four cases where judges expressed concern about 
coerced abortion). 
 183. See supra notes 156-57, 169-71. 
 184. See, e.g., Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114 (overturning a no-pregnancy-unless-
married probation condition ordered against a woman who was convicted of grand 
theft and battery). 
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federal cases stand out as exceptions, where judges ordered men not 
to have children even though their crimes had nothing to do with 
children or being a father. 
Finally, appellate courts did not uphold any of these restrictions on 
women.  In two cases, the courts considered the woman’s appeal 
moot, either because she had been sent to prison for violating other 
conditions of her probation, or because she (apparently voluntarily) 
obtained Norplant while appealing an order that the local health 
department “assist” her in obtaining surgical sterilization.185 
When striking down a trial court’s probation order prohibiting non-
marital sex for two women and one man in 1980, a Florida appellate 
court stated, “While the trial court obviously intended to prevent the 
birth of additional children to alleviate additional financial pressure 
on appellants, the condition does not have that effect.  Instead, it 
coerces appellants into marriage so they may lawfully engage in 
sex.”186  This appellate court was very generous in its reading of the 
trial court’s intention: to alleviate additional financial pressure on the 
defendants, poor, single parents.187  Some sentencing judges have 
been rather explicit in their concerns that defendants before them—
in these cases, all women—are burdening the state with their 
“illegitimate” children.188  In 1965, a California judge conditioned 
probation for Mercedes Dominguez, a twenty-year-old unmarried 
mother of two who was pregnant at time of sentencing, on not getting 
pregnant out of wedlock, and he made good on his threat to revoke 
her probation when she became pregnant again.189  The appellate 
court overturned this condition, with a clear reprimand to the judge 
who let his personal views on “welfare mothers” affect his 
sentencing.190  The court quotes him as saying, “You are going to 
prison unless you are married first. You already have too many of 
those,” as if children were objects to be collected, and chiding her for 
                                                          
 185. See ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 152 (explaining that an appellate court 
dismissed Darlene Johnson’s appeal as moot after she was remanded to prison); see 
also In re Lacey P., 433 S.E.2d at 525-26 (distinguishing the trial court’s order that the 
Department of Health and Human Services assist the defendant in her “expressed 
desire” to be sterilized, from a court order mandating her to become sterile, an order 
which the court doubted could ever be valid). 
 186. Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48; see id. at 48 n.2 (noting that fornication—defined 
as sex with an unmarried woman—was illegal in Florida until 1979, when the state 
supreme court struck down the statute as an impermissible sex-based classification). 
 187. See id. at 48 (disagreeing with the trial court’s presumption that “legitimate” 
children pose less of a financial burden on parents than extramarital children). 
 188. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267. 
 189. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (relating the history of the case). 
 190. See id. at 625. 
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letting the community assume responsibility for her children.191 
Twenty-five years later, in California v. Zaring, an appellate court 
remarked on the similarity between Dominguez and the case before it 
for review.192  The sentencing judge had scolded the defendant, 
stating, “I want [to make] it clear that one of the reasons I am making 
this order is you’ve got five children. You’re thirty years old.  None of 
your children are in your custody or control.  Two of them on 
AFDC.”193  Similarly, a Louisiana judge told a twenty-year-old mother 
of two “illegitimate children” that having children outside of marriage 
indicated “irresponsible thinking.”194 
In California, three cases that went up on appeal all justified 
prohibiting pregnancy by referring to the woman’s dependence on 
public assistance.195  The women who pursued these appeals were 
Latina, African American, and white.196  The California cases illustrate 
that women from many groups have been affected by judicial orders 
while also making clear that the invocation of welfare, if accepted as a 
legitimate reason to limit reproduction in the criminal sentencing 
context, would have a disproportionate impact on women of color. 
CONCLUSION: STATE POWER, GENDER POLITICS, AND THE RESILIENCE 
OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL 
The cases discussed in this article demonstrate a number of ways 
that courts dealing with reproductive rights claims in the criminal 
justice arena can suppress gender equality.  A crucial component of 
court decisions concerning men is the pivotal, but unstated, role of 
women.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Oakley is a 
danger to women presented as if it were a gift, a penalty imposed on 
men to “protect” women: the decision makes women vulnerable to 
                                                          
 191. Id. (reviewing trial court’s remarks to the defendant, which included asking 
whether she knew where the Planned Parenthood Clinic was located). Women’s 
ability to obtain contraception in 1965 would have been a matter of local discretion, 
and abortion was illegal everywhere, making compliance with the court’s order 
difficult and potentially dangerous. See generally MCCANN, supra note 147; TYLER 
MAY, supra note 112; ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000 
(Rickie Solinger ed., 1998). 
 192. See Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-74 (reviewing a no-pregnancy probation 
order resulting from a conviction for possessing and being under the influence of 
heroin).  The appellate court highlighted that the trial court here, as well as the trial 
court in the Dominguez case, made commentary that reflected their personal social 
values.  Id. at 373-74. 
 193. Id. at 368. 
 194. Norman, 484 So. 2d at 953. 
 195. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93; Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266-67; 
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
 196. See Arthur, supra note 92, at 11 (describing Zaring as white). 
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coercion and imperils their right to have children.197  Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit panel decision in Gerber expanded rights for some men 
at the expense of all women.198 
By emphasizing these cases’ implications for gender equality, I do 
not mean to suggest that men do not face very real consequences if 
they are caught violating the terms of their probation or parole. They 
do. But there is no way to engage in this particular form of policing 
men without also policing women, and this basic fact often escapes 
judicial notice.199  If the danger in some of these cases lurks under 
the radar, it is patently obvious in others.  In a Tennessee case, for 
example, a judge “negotiated” a sterilization-for-probation deal with 
Mrs. Gross, but did nothing to curtail the fertility of Mr. Gross, even 
though both pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse of their 
children.200  To make matters worse, the judge presented two 
alternatives: either five years prison for both or ten years probation for 
both if Mrs. Gross got her “tubes tied,” making his freedom 
contingent on her decision.201  Sentencing judges appear to take 
more latitude with women than with men by restricting their 
reproductive lives more often and for more reasons, such as 
prohibiting childbearing outside of marriage when women commit 
economic crimes.202  This pattern fits with courts’ historic 
preoccupation with policing white women’s sexuality and gender 
conformity.203  The economic and social marginality of poor women 
who are single mothers relying on public assistance appears to be a 
powerful combination for some judges who see enforcing “personal 
responsibility” as a legitimate exercise of their authority.204 
Courts also apply reproductive restrictions to women who have 
                                                          
 197. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (upholding a ban on procreation for a man 
who had not paid child support). 
 198. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882. 
 199. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing how the birth of a 
child would provide evidence that a man had violated his probation). 
 200. See Dresser, supra note 109, at 137. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See supra  notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
 203. See, e.g., NICOLE RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL 41 (2d ed. 1990); LUCIA ZEDNER, Wayward Sisters: The Prison for Women, 
in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 329 (Norval Morris & David Rothman eds., 1998) (explaining, in addition, 
that before the advent of gender-based equal protection, some courts and sentencing 
guidelines gave women harsher sentences than men, even in the case of a man and 
woman breaking the law together, because they thought women were harder to 
rehabilitate, since committing crime in the first place signified their fall from gender 
requirements). 
 204. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving 
women who receive public assistance). 
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abused children and to women who have used drugs,205 because these 
women fall short of the mark of normative womanhood.206  These 
cases suggest that courts as disciplinary institutions cast a wider net 
with the women who come before them than with men.  What then 
are we to make of courts’ greater willingness to uphold reproductive 
restrictions imposed on men?  Does this too hark back to a kind of 
gender inequality, expressed in the motherhood imperative? 
One judge who had ordered at least two women to use birth control 
defended himself against accusations of discrimination this way: “This 
Court in a proper case with appropriate technology would make a 
similar order against a man. The mere fact that technology has not 
arrived to implant a man does not mean that it should not be used in 
a woman.”207  In these comments, Judge Broadman does not consider 
the ways that sex discrimination and the close cultural association 
between women and all things reproductive might influence the 
development of contraceptive technology and forestall the “arrival” of 
means to restrict men. 
In addition to the implications these cases have for women’s rights 
outside of the criminal justice system, the cases have important 
implications for prisoners’ rights beyond reproduction.  As Franklin 
Zimring says of the final decision in Gerber: 
[T]his kind of litigation outcome may be a symptom of a much 
larger failure to take seriously the question of the legitimate 
interests of prisoners and those who are in sustained relationships 
with them.  I am much more worried about the majority’s 
dismissiveness of the human interest involved in a case like this than 
I am about the ease of ridiculing the idea of a constitutional right to 
send sperm through the mail.208 
An op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle displays exactly the 
dismissiveness Zimring fears by saying: “Earth to the Ninth Circuit 
court: the ‘legitimate penological reason’ [to deny Gerber’s request] 
is that prison is punishment.  No freedom.  No hot Starbucks lattes.  
No new babies.”209  Although not as mean-spirited as this 
commentator, the judge writing for the Eighth Circuit was 
                                                          
 205. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
 206. See generally MOTHER TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL 
DILEMMAS (Julia A. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999) (describing punitive 
responses to women who do not meet societal standards of good motherhood). 
 207. Michelle Oberman, Commentary: The Control of Pregnancy and the 
Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6 n.24 (1992). 
 208. Henry Weinstein, Inmate May Not Ship Wife Semen, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 
2002, at B1. 
 209. See Debra Saunders, Ill-Conceived Parenthood, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 2001, at 
A13. 
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unsympathetic when Steven Goodwin and his wife expressed concern 
that by the time he got out of prison, she would be facing greater risks 
of having a child with birth defects.210  The court dismissed this worry 
with a few statistics, presuming to assess the risks for Goodwin and his 
partner, when reproductive risk assessment is both a highly personal 
and a highly cultural enterprise, not one of mere odds.211 
The publicity and success of the Oakley case seem to be inspiring 
more prosecutors and judges to impose sexual and reproductive 
restrictions.212  In the spring of 2002, for instance, Luther Crawford 
of Kentucky signed an agreement pleading guilty to two counts of 
flagrant nonsupport and agreeing to abstinence as a condition of 
probation.213  Crawford subsequently challenged the condition, but 
the judge presiding over the case ultimately sentenced him to jail 
instead, leaving the status of the abstinence condition unclear.214  In 
what might be considered a pre-emptive move (or “proactive,” as the 
plea agreement put it), a twenty-eight-year-old Kentucky man being 
prosecuted by the same government attorney underwent a vasectomy 
in order to improve his chances of getting probation instead of jail 
time.215  The news story suggests he owed “more than $1,000” in child 
support.216  Hopefully, this low dollar amount is a typo. 
An Ohio judge concerned that an outright ban on procreation 
might not survive appellate review instead imposed a “softer” 
requirement that a defendant “take reasonable efforts to avoid 
conception,” such as using birth control.217  While not as likely to 
trigger incarceration if violated, this requirement invites a high level 
of micro-management on the part of the judge.218  Ohio courts in the 
                                                          
 210. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1396 (upholding a policy to prohibit a prisoner 
from providing semen to his wife for the purpose of insemination). 
 211. See id. at 1397 (citing to statistics that predict the chances of having a child 
with Downs Syndrome).  See generally RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE 
FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing how 
women interpret the meanings of amniocentesis). 
 212. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621. 
 213. See Hall, supra note 174. 
 214. See Bruce Schreiner, Deadbeat Dad Sent To Prison But Avoids No-Sex 
Condition, APWIRES, May 14, 2002. 
 215. See Man Undergoes Vasectomy To Try To Win Probation, APWIRES, July 26, 
2002. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Terry Oblander, Fathering More Children Could Land Dad in Jail, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 7, 2002, at B1, B3; see also Terry Oblander, Fatherhood Ban 
Considered for Deadbeat Dads, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 27, 2002 (discussing a 
court’s strategy to deter a defendant from fathering any more children during his 
five-year probation for failing to pay child support). 
 218. See Oblander, Fathering More Children, supra note 217, at B1, B3 (noting 
that the judge said that the defendant “could father a child without violating his 
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1970s and 1990s had struck down procreation bans imposed on 
women.219  Though the press may now be especially attuned to cases 
about men, women are also feeling the consequences.  One month 
after the state supreme court upheld Oakley’s punishment, a 
Wisconsin judge placed a twenty-six-year-old woman on probation for 
ten years and ordered her not to have children.220  She had been 
convicted of second-degree reckless homicide in the starvation of her 
infant daughter.221 A Michigan judge ordered a woman facing child 
abuse allegations to use a “verifiable” form of birth control, such as an 
IUD or Depo-Provera injections.222  Apparently, the first such case in 
the state, the judge rescinded his order once confronted with an 
appeal.223  A Florida woman who pleaded no contest to attempted 
murder of her baby was sterilized as part of the plea agreement.224  
And in an apparent first for the entire Northeast region, a New York 
judge recently ordered a couple not to have more children until they 
prove they can care for the children they already have, all of whom 
are in foster care.225 
In the Fall of 2002, the United States Supreme Court declined to 
hear Gerber’s appeal, sending imprisoned men back to square one if 
they encounter administrative resistance to their desire to father 
children.226  Perhaps somewhat more surprising, the Court also 
rebuffed Oakley’s appeal, ensuring that these conflicts will continue 
to arise, but without any guarantee of public oversight, whether from 
                                                          
probation if [the judge] was convinced that [he] had tried to use birth control but it 
failed”); see also Ed Meyer, Ohio Court Skeptical of Procreation Limits, BEACON 
JOURNAL, May 12, 2004 (describing oral argument before the Ohio Supreme Court 
about the probation condition), available at http://www.ohio.com/mld/ 
beaconjournal/8643952.htm?1c (last visited Sept 27, 2004). 
 219. See generally Richard, 680 N.E. at 667 (invalidating the tubal ligation and 
birth control conditions of the defendant’s probation); Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 
1335 (holding that prohibiting the defendant from having children during her five 
year probation period was a violation of her constitutional right to privacy and a 
violation of the trial court’s discretion). 
 220. See Judge Orders Woman To Have No More Children, APWIRES, Aug. 30, 
2001 (noting that if this woman violated the order and had more children she could 
face up to fifteen years in prison). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See Addict’s Birth Control Order Fought, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 9, 2003. 
 223. See In re J.N.G. and B.S., No. 246592, 2003 WL 22299795 (Mich. App. Oct. 7, 
2003); see also Telephone interview with Michael Steinberg, Legal Director, ACLU of 
Michigan (Mar. 1, 2004). 
 224. See Panhandle Woman’s Sentence Cut, But Illinois Prison Waits, APWIRES, 
Apr. 4, 2003. 
 225. See Marc Santora, Negligent Upstate Couple Is Told Not To Procreate, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at B6 (explaining that the judge did not specify how the woman 
should avoid pregnancy). 
 226. See Gerber v. Hickman, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002). 
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the media, watchdog groups, or reviewing courts.227  In this time of 
deep budget deficits, we may be seeing greater use of probation as 
alternatives to incarceration gain pragmatic political support.  The 
gulf between sentencing judges’ actions and appellate judges’ 
evaluations of those actions suggests that these issues will not be 
resolved any time soon.   
                                                          
 227. See Oakley v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). 
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